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Religion and First Amendment Protections: An
Analysis of Justice Black's Constitutional
Interpretation
DR. CONSTANCE MAUNEY*
Justice Hugo L. Black served on the United States Supreme Court over a
period of thirty-four years, encompassing Supreme Court terms from 1937
to 1971. During this period, the subject of the constitutional limitations of
the freedom of religion was increasingly subjected to intense social
pressures.
Justice Black figured prominently in the development of constitutional
law as the Supreme Court attempted to give meaning to the establishment
and free exercise clause of the first amendment. He wrote the majority
opinions which dealt with the establishment clause in the Everson, McCul-
loin, Engel and Torcaso cases. Ye4 on later occasions, Justice Black
strongly criticized the Court for ignoring his legal reasoning and breaching
the wall of separation of church and state. During his early years on the
bench, Justice Black voted to uphold convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses in
the Cox, Chaplinsky, Minersville and Prince cases. Although his record
was marred by these early votes and later by his votes to uphold Sunday
closing laws, Justice Black, in most of the cases dealing with free exercise
of religion earned well-deserved praise for expansion of the constitution-
ally protected freedom of religion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Hugo LaFayette Black was highly instrumental in giving
meaning to the short but terse mandate of the first amendment
that "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof... ."1 He was
classified by scholars as an absolutist,2 and he frequently affirmed
* B.S. (1954), MA. (1970), Ph.D. (1975), University of Tennessee, Knoxville,
Assistant Professor of Political Science, David Lipscomb College, Nashville,
Tennessee.
1. U.S. CONST. amend I.
2. See Strickland, Mr. Justice Black: A Reappraisal, 25 FED. B.J. 365, 368-76
(1965); see also Frantz, The First Amendment in Balance, 71 YALE LJ., 1424, 1434-35
(1962). The "absolutist" position is one which reduces the role of judicial interpre-
tation in favor of a more literal and rigid construction of the Bill of Rights. Strick-
land believes that the term "modified absolutist" provides a more accurate
description of Justice Black. Strickland, supra at 376. See infra note 36.
that the first amendment's phrase "no law" should be interpreted
according to its plain meaning.3 Except in cases where the issues
of speech and conduct were intermingled, Justice Black seldom
veered from that high standard in cases which dealt with speech
and press issues. Analysis of his opinions and votes in free exer-
cise and establishment of religion cases illustrates, however, that
Justice Black deviated from his self-imposed standard of "no
law." On occasion, he voted to uphold governmental regulation
despite a litigant's complaints that unconstitutional limitations
had been placed on religious freedoms guaranteed by the first
amendment.4 In several cases concerning the establishment of
religion, Justice Black appeared unimpressed with claims that the
constitutionally mandated separation of church and state had
been infringed. For example, despite the claim that the first
amendment had been violated by the erection of a string of lights
in the shape of a cross on the county courthouse in Miami, Flor-
ida, Justice Black remained conspicuously silent when the
Supreme Court, over the objection of Justice William 0. Douglas,
voted to deny certiorari. 5
Justice Black, whose family roots were in the Bible belt, was no
stranger to organized religion or the content of the Bible. When
he practiced law in Birmingham, Alabama, he actively partici-
3. See Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Inter-
view, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 553-54 (1962). See Everson v. Board of Educ., 360 U.S. 1
(1947), where Justice Black stated his "wall of separation" metaphor. He believed
that "[tl he First Amendment [had] erected a wall between church and state." Id.
at 18.
4. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). In Cox, the Court up-
held a statute requiring persons using the public streets for parade or procession
to procure a special license despite petitioners' claim that the law abridged their
freedom of religious worship. The Court noted, however, that the freedom of wor-
ship issue was ancillary to the central issue of whether a municipality has the au-
thority to impose regulations which promote public safety and convenience
without violating civil liberties. Id. at 574; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1940) (conviction of Jehovah's Witness who had violated statute prohibiting
use of profanity in public affirmed despite defendant's objections that his state-
ments were religiously motivated); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 580
(1940) (expelling pupils who refused to salute the flag because of their own beliefs
did not constitute a violation of their due process rights); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944) (a state may prohibit adults from providing minors with reli-
gious materials when the adult knows the child intends to sell or distribute the
material in a public place); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (rejected a
claim that a statute prohibiting all but certain businesses from operating on Sun-
days was a violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment); Braun-
feld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upheld a Pennsylvania statute banning work on
Sunday despite claims that the statute violated the equal protection clause and
constituted a law relating to the establishment of religion); Gallagher v. Crown
Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (upheld a Massachusetts Sunday closing
law); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (approved a Pennsylvania Sun-
day closing law).
5. Paul v. Dade County, 390 U.S. 1041 (1968).
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pated in the activities of the Baptist Church. His twenty years as
a Sunday school teacher 6 acquainted him with Scriptures which
appear in at least four of his Supreme Court opinions.7 His affilia-
tion with the fundamentalist denomination might have molded
his attitude toward rejection of practices such as school prayers
composed by public officials. However, an examination of a
number of his legal positions in cases dealing with conscientious
objectors, and those relating to religious exercises in public
school buildings, including Bible reading and recital of the Lord's
Prayer, indicates that the Justice was strongly sympathetic to-
ward litigants who professed no belief in God or in doctrines of
organized churches. This attitude may be explained, in part, by
the fact that Justice Black experienced a significant change in
philosophy after he left Birmingham. Jerome Cooper, his first
Supreme Court law clerk, observed that Justice Black did not at-
tend formal worship services, and described Justice Black as a
"reverent agnostic."8
Charles Maples, a Baptist minister, together with a group of
ministers, met privately with Justice Black in 1964, and discov-
ered that the Justice was no longer active in the church. In an in-
terview with Charles Maples on May 21, 1975, it was revealed that
as early as the 1950's, Justice Black had begun to support a
number of tenets of the Unitarian Church.9 Yet in a letter to W.
6. FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN AND HIS OPINIONS 16 (1949).
7. See MEADOR, MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND HIS BOOKS 27 (1947); Griffin v. Ill.,
351 U.S. 12, 16 (1965) (Black writing for the majority held that Illinois denial to an
indigent defendant a copy of the transcripts of his trial without charge to the indi-
gent constituted violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 341 (1957) (Black dissenting
from majority opinion which upheld Ohio statute allowing fire marshals to conduct
complusory investigatory interviews where interviewee is denied right to counsel);
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 798 (1950) (Black dissenting from decision
denying the right to a writ of habeas corpus to German citizens convicted of war
crimes by American military tribunal); In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 575 (1945)
(Black dissenting from majority opinion holding that Illinois State Bar could prop-
erly deny the admission of a conscientious objector on the grounds that he could
not swear allegiance to Illinois State Constitution without denying the applicant
any rights under the first and fourteenth amendments). For example, in Sum-
mers, Justice Black's dissent contained an examination of the teachings of Christ,
including quotations from St. Matthew 5:38, 39, 44. 325 U.S. at 575 n.1.
8. Cooper, Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black: Footnotes to a Great Case, 24 ALA. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1971). The term "reverent agnostic" was used by Felix Frankfurter
when describing himself as one who was interested in theological matters, yet un-
committed to ceremony or a particular denomination. See FRANKFURTER, FELIX
FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 291 (1960).
9. Interview with Charles Maples (May 21, 1975).
Howard Bramlette, one of the ministers who attended the 1964
private session, Justice Black indicated that he still retained an
admiration for the principles of the Baptist Church.O
Justice Black sat on the Supreme Court for thirty-four years,"
a period which provided a remarkable opportunity for him to par-
ticipate in defining the meaning of the first amendment. The Jus-
tice uniformly seized such opportunities with great enthusiasm.
His opinions reveal that he spent a considerable amount of time
studying history in order to support his reasonings' 2 and per-
suade colleagues and future courts that his interpretations re-
garding the first amendment were legally correct. He strongly
identified with the stance taken by Thomas Jefferson with regard
to the constitutional separation between church and state. How-
ever, during his tenure on the bench, Justice Black sometimes ad-
mittedly faltered in his interpretation of the free exercise clause
of the first amendment,13 and at other times, his judicial crafts-
manship was defective, and he refused to acknowledge it. His po-
sition was contradictory on occasion, but on the whole, Justice
Black played a significant role in determining the demarcations
between church and state and in expanding the boundaries of the
free exercise of religion.
During Justice Black's long tenure, the Supreme Court was in-
undated with cases which touched upon religion in one way or an-
10. Letter from Hugo L. Black to Mr. H. Howard Bramlette (April 3, 1964),
Black files, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
11. Justice Black had one of the longest tenures on the Court, serving 34
years, from 1937 to 1971. Justice Field served for 34 years and 196 days. However,
on October 27, 1973, Justice Douglas surpassed Justice Field's prior record of ten-
ure and continued on the Court until he retired on Nov. 12, 1975. V. COUNTRYMAN,
THE JUDICIAL RECORD OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS vi (1974); W.O. DOUGLAS,
THE COURT YEARS ix (1980).
12. E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dis-
senting); Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Act. Cont. Bd., 367
U.S. 1, 137-69 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black often used history as
precedent to support his interpretations of the first amendment's protection of
both freedom of the press and freedom of speech. Black's opinions reflected two
interrelated themes of his use of history: his personal fondness for examples
drawn from English history and his assumption that he actually knew what the
Founding Fathers meant concerning the first amendment. E.E. DENNIS, D.M. GILL-
MOR, AND D.L. GREY, JUSTICE HUGO BLACK AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 30 vii (1978).
Jerome Cooper, Justice Black's first law clerk, described the Justice as an avid
reader of ancient and American history and also pointed out that, prior to his com-
mencement of service on the Court, Black read the entire series of the United
States Reports. Cooper, Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black: Footnotes to a Great Case, 24
ALA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623-24 (1942) (Black, J., dis-
senting) (Black admits his faulty reasoning in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis,
310 U.S. 586 (1940)). "Since we joined in the opinion in the Gobitis case, we think
this is an appropriate occasion to state that we now believe that it also was
wrongly decided." 316 U.S. at 623-24.
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other.14 In many of these cases, Justice Black's "silent votes"
deserve special analysis in order to supplement data collected
from his majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Opinions
written by other justices with whom Justice Black concurred are
also important sources for a complete analysis of his interpreta-
tion of the first amendment. Understanding the complexity of
Justice Black's position on major legal issues necessitates an ex-
ploration into a multiplicity of cases concerning the following
broad categories: violation of law by marching Jehovah's Wit-
nesses;15 antagonism caused by religious zealots; 16 governmental
funds which directly or indirectly aided parochial schools;17 use of
public property for religious instruction;18 laws which adversely
affect the economic welfare of individuals who practiced their reli-
gion;19 prosecutions of conscientious objectors;20 suits filed by
14. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school prayers); Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (minor plaintiffs were prohibited from
attending school because of their refusal to salute the national flag based upon
their personal religious philosophy).
15. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). Five Jehovah's Witnesses who
marched with sixty-three others were convicted for violation of a state statute
prohibiting a parade or procession upon a public street without a special license.
The Court found the statute to be a reasonable time, place and manner restriction
which had been applied on a nondiscriminatory basis and sustained the convic-
tion. The state had the right to prevent unscheduled parades for traffic and safety
purposes. See supra note 4.
16. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Cantwell was convicted of vi-
olating a Connecticut statute prohibiting the solicitation of money without prior
approval of the Secretary of Public Welfare and for inciting a breach of the peace.
Although Cantwell had aroused the animosity of two passing pedestrians by play-
ing a record which embodied a general attack on all religion as an instrument of
Satan, his conduct was found not to have amounted to a breach of the peace.
"[I]n the absence of a statute narrowly drawn ... the petitioner's communication,
considered in the light of the constitutional guarantees, raised no such clear and
present menace to public peace and order as to render him liable...." 310 U.S. at
311.
17. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The Court held that the gov-
ernment may lend state approved textbooks to all students, including those at-
tending parochial schools. The statute was not a "law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" and, therefore, was not in vio-
lation of the Constitution. 392 U.S. at 238.
18. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (Petitioner alleged that Il-
linois practice of permitting religious instructors to teach religion to pupils during
mandatory school hours violated the first and fourteenth amendments).
19. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (owner of
Jewish grocery store challenged Sunday closing laws). See supra note 4.
20. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (Illinois state bar denied admittance to
conscientious objector); see supra note 7.
churches against other churches;21 oaths required for public em-
ployment;22 taxation of church property;23 distribution of religious
literature and sermons on public streets;24 activities in classrooms
which conflicted with religious beliefs;25 religious exercises in
classrooms which were offensive to one or more students;26 and
the academic freedom of teachers who were prohibited from
teaching evolution.27
II. PUBLIC DISSEMINATION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
During Justice Black's early years on the bench, the Supreme
Court often considered questions dealing with the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, an active and aggressive minority sect.28 The controver-
sial style of their evangelism resulted in a substantial number of
cases being appealed to the Court. In their zeal to quickly con-
vert large numbers of persons to their religious doctrine, the sect
members sometimes overstepped the boundaries set by good
taste, custom, or law. Not only were breach of peace convictions
commonplace,29 but the Jehovah's Witnesses often ignored local
ordinances which required licenses or permits to carry on evan-
gelistic activities. 30 These cases set the pattern for judicial
thought and analysis to the extent that much of the interpretation
21. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (although Court
recognized legitimate interest in resolution of disputes involving property rights,
recognized that disputes which require courts to interpret church doctrine are not
within role of civil courts).
22. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
23. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). (New York's policy of granting
property tax exemption to religious organizations held constitutional; goal of gov-
ernment with respect to religion is benevolent neutrality).
24. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (Court reversed conviction for viola-
tion of ordinance which prohibited public worship meeting in the street without
first obtaining permit); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (ordinance prohibiting
distribution of literature of any kind without obtaining prior permit found uncon-
stitutional on its face as restraint on first amendment rights).
25. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school prayers).
26. Id.
27. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
28. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955); Sicurella v. United
States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955); Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955); Dickinson
v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569 (1941); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
29. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
30. See Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955); Sicurella v. United
States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955); Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955); Dickinson
v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953).
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of the first amendment in the 1940's and early 1950's was the re-
sult of this minority sect's conflict with local and state officials.
While Justice Black's position was contrary to contentions of that
sect in at least four cases,3 1 his support for their rights was
demonstrated in numerous other decisions. 32 Regardless of Jus-
tice Black's personal views about the Jehovah's Witness' move-
ment, he was among the members of the Court who generally
interpreted the first amendment in a manner which resulted in in-
creased protection for religious practices.
In Schneider v. Irvington, 33 Justice Black voted to strike down
convictions for violations of anti-littering regulations. The stance
was taken to protect free speech and press rights of individuals
who desired to communicate their ideas through the distribution
of leaflets. The petitioner, Clara Schneider, was originally con-
victed because she failed to obtain a permit from the chief of po-
lice as required by local ordinance before handing out pamphlets
describing the philosophy of the Jehovah's Witnesses. In Schnei-
der 34 and three companion cases, the Court chose to focus upon
the freedom of speech and freedom of press rights rather than the
free exercise clause. These first amendment rights had been
found to be applicable to state and local governments in the cases
of Gitlow v. New York 3 and Near v. Minnesota36 pursuant to the
fourteenth amendment. But as of 1939, Justice Black had not yet
adopted this conclusion himself. His famous and controversial
Adamson v. California37 dissenting opinion had not yet been
written at this point.
Justice Black ultimately agreed with the majority of the Court
31. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
32. See, e.ge., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
33. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Justice Black generally maintained an "absolutist" po-
sition with regard to constitutional questions; the first amendment was a prime ex-
ample. "My view is, without deviation, without exception, without any ifs, buts, or
whereas that freedom of speech means that government shall not do anything to
people, either for their views they have or the views they express or the words
they speak or write." H. BLACK, A CONSTrruTrIONAL FArrH 45 (1968); see also H.
BALL, THE VISION AND THE DREAM OF JusncE HUGO L. BLACK 142 (1975). See
supra note 2.
34. Schneider held that the freedom of speech and press secured by the first
amendment against violations by the federal government are also protected from
violation by state governments pursuant to fourteenth amendment. 308 U.S. at 160.
35. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
36. 283 U.S. 647 (1931).
37. 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
that both the free exercise 38 and establishment clauses 39 were ap-
plicable to state and local governments through the fourteenth
amendment. The Court did not completely accept Black's incor-
poration theory, but nevertheless continued to broaden the pro-
tections of the first amendment on a case by case basis. Even
after each first amendment freedom was incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court continued to play an
active role in determining the extent of the particular freedom
challenged by accepting review of selected court cases.
In the 1941 case of Cox v. New Hampshire, 40 Justice Black voted
to uphold criminal sanctions imposed on Jehovah's Witnesses
when issues of freedom of religion, expression, and conduct were
intermingled. Cox involved a peaceful march by members of a
small group of Jehovah's Witnesses who had not secured a parade
permit. The Supreme Court held that the state had the right to
regulate conduct upon the streets even at the expense of the free-
dom of expression. One year later, in Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire,41 Justice Black voted to uphold the breach of peace
conviction of an overly enthusiastic Jehovah's Witness who had
cursed a policeman. It was held that "fighting words" lacked the
protection of the first amendment. 42 The decision most likely
came as a surprise for the defendant and his lawyers, because
two years earlier another Jehovah's Witness had a similar con-
viction overturned in the landmark case of Cantwell v. Con-
necticut. 43
On April 26, 1938, Jesse Cantwell went to a predominantly Cath-
olic neighborhood with his books and a portable phonograph rec-
38. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); see supra note 16.
39. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1. (1947)
The meaning and scope of the First Amendment, preventing establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, in the light of its
history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress, have been sev-
eral times elaborated by the decisions of this Court prior to the applica-
tion of the First Amendment to the states by the Fourteenth. The broad
meaning given the Amendment by these earlier cases has been accepted
by this Court in its decisions concerning an individual's religious freedom
rendered since the Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to make the
prohibitions of the First applicable to state action abridging religious free-
dom. There is every reason to give the same application and broad inter-
pretation to the "establishment of religion" clause.
Id. at 14-15 (citations omitted).
40. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
41. 315 U.S. 568 (1942); see supra note 4.
42. Id. The Court defined "fighting words" as "those which by their very utter-
ance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id. at 572.
The Court mentioned the examples of lewd, obscene, libelous or insulting words.
Such words were found not to contain any essential exposition of ideas and were
of such slight social value that "any benefit that may be derived from them [was]
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Id.
43. 310 U.S. 296 (1940); see supra notes 16 & 38.
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ord player and asked two men if he could play a record for them.
The men agreed, but soon became infuriated by the denunciation
of the Catholic Church presented on the recording. After several
threats from the listeners, Cantwell left the area without
argument."
In Cantwell, the Court struck down the conviction of the de-
fendant which was based upon a violation of a statute requiring a
certificate to distribute legally religious publications. The statute
was found to grant undue discretion to public authorities without
establishing sufficient standards. This unlimited discretion al-
lowed for the possibility of governmental censorship and thus vio-
lated the first amendment. The Court found no "clear and
present danger" by the defendant's conduct, and overturned peti-
tioner Cantwell's breach of peace conviction.45 Writing for the
majority, Justice Owen Roberts maintained, "[T] he First Amend-
ment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the
states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws."46
Justice Roberts essentially stated that the meaning of freedom
of religion included the lack of compulsion to accept or practice a
particular religious doctrine, freedom to participate in any reli-
gious organization, and the freedom to hold any individually cho-
sen religious belief.47 The first amendment "safeguards the free
exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment em-
braces two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom to act.
The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second can-
44. 310 U.S. at 303.
45. Id. at 311. The Court noted that "[W]hen clear and present danger of riot,
disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate
threat to public safety, peace, or order appears, the power of the State to prevent
or punish is obvious." Id. at 308. The test for determining when a "clear and pres-
ent danger" occurs was first stated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919), as follows: "The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent." Id. at 52. The test was later modified by Justice Brandeis,
in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), by adding
the requirement of "imminence."
The Court found that "[sIuch a censorship of religion ... is a denial of liberty
protected by the First Amendment and included in the liberty which is within the
protection of the Fourteenth." Cantwell 310 U.S. at 305.
46. 310 U.S. at 303.
47. Id.
not be."48 This guideline fashioned by Justice Roberts was simi-
lar to Justice Black's ideas relative to concepts which had
absolute protection under the first amendment such as speech or
passive belief. Thus, it was the opinion of both men that neither
action nor conduct was given absolute protection by the
Constitution.49
Justice Black consistently attempted to overturn convictions of
members of the Jehovah's Witness sect who chose distribution of
leaflets as their method of evangelizing a neighborhood or town.50
According to Justice Black, passing out leaflets and playing reli-
gious records fell within the range of first amendment protec-
tions.51 Accordingly, it was his position that when city officials
imposed a license tax effectively acting upon rights granted by
the Constitution, they invaded freedom of press, speech and reli-
gion guarantees. In 1943, writing for the majority in Murdock v.
Pennsylvania,52 Justice Douglas analogized distribution of reli-
gious literature with worship and preaching in church buildings.
Justice Douglas believed that selling church literature was similar
to passing the collection basket, and therefore held that a license
fee could not be imposed on a Jehovah's Witness who went from
door to door passing out tracts.53 Justice Black basically agreed
and believed that most activities interrelated with religion were
protected by the first amendment guarantees. To that end he felt
that the Consitution precluded, among other things: taxation of
persons whose entire living was earned from the sale of religious
literature; mechanisms to keep door bells silent during the day in
a mill town; laws applied to ban religious literature from company
owned towns and federally controlled villages; and other devices
used to keep the Jehovah's Witnesses and other distributors of
leaflets off the streets. 54
48. Id. at 303-04.
49. "Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." Id.
at 304.
50. See Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Grif-
fin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
51. See supra note 50. Justice Black emphasized the importance of first
amendment rights but he was also careful to recognize "the consequences of
speech and press accompanied by conduct that was anarchic ...." H. BALL, supra
note 33, at 198.
52. 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (license tax imposed by city officials pursuant to local
statute upon the selling of religious pamphlets was found to violate first amend-
ment guarantees of freedom of press and free exercise of religion). Id. at 117.
53. Id. at 108-09.
54. Black concluded that the state's interests in certain activities were insuffi-
cient to allow circumvention of first amendment guarantees. See, e.g., Tucker v.
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In United States v. Ballard,5 5 the question presented was
whether the free exercise of religion was in jeopardy. The leaders
of the "I Am" religious movement claimed special revelations and
special powers from God.56 It was alleged that they used the
mails to defraud the public. The Supreme Court held that a jury
lacked the power to examine the beliefs of an individual and pun-
ish him for preaching a message which was based upon the indi-
vidual's espoused ostensible relationship with God.57 Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that to allow this punish-
ment to stand would end religious freedom in the United States. 58
He noted that many religions are based upon the New Testament
with its emphasis on miracles, revelations, life after death, and
other beliefs that could not be proven in a courtroom before a
jury. The Court, with Justice Black concurring, chose to interpret
the first amendment in such a way that bizarre as well as tradi-
tional religious beliefs were within the scope of the free exercise
clause.59
In 1955, Justice Black concurred in the Court's reversal of judg-
ment in favor of two preachers who had discussed their religious
beliefs in places where such activity was restricted by local stat-
ute. In Kunz v. New York, 6 0 the petitioner had preached on the
streets in New York City without a license from the city police
Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946) (laws banning religious literature from public property);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (laws banning religious literature from
quasi-private property); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (sales
tax of religious literature); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (doorbell silenc-
ing mechanisms); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (distribution
of leaflets which resulted in littering).
55. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
56. The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if
not preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines are subject to
trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same
can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact
undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain.
Id. at 87.
57. Id. at 87-88.
58. The opinion of Justice Douglas is best summarized as follows: "Freedom
of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free
men." Id. at 86 (citing West Virginia Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943)).
59. See supra note 56.
60. 340 U.S. 290 (1951). Justice Black was of the belief that the Supreme Court
should overturn legislation only if it was clear that a constitutional guarantee had
been violated. Snowiss, The Legacy of Justice Black, 1973 SuP. CT. REV. 187, 194-95,
197.
commissioner. In Niemotko v. Maryland, 61 petitioner preached in
a public park without proper clearance from the Park Commis-
sioner. These opinions indicated that factors such as whether a
law contained a provision for an administrative approval in order
to address the public, or whether the practice of such prior ap-
proval was based on custom, 62 carried little weight upon the
Court's interpretation of the first amendment and its protection of
the rights of individuals who wished to discuss their religious
views with others.
In Fowler v. Rhode Island, 63 a five dollar fine was imposed upon
a minister of the Jehovah's Witnesses for preaching a sermon in a
public park to a large gathering of both members and non-mem-
bers of his sect. With Justice Douglas, again writing for the ma-
jority, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment against the
minister because the city ordinance had been applied in such a
fashion as to discriminate against one religious service, while al-
lowing the performance of worship services by more acceptable
denominations as defined by informal local standards. The prac-
tice of governmental evaluation of the content of sermons in order
to determine which minister could preside over a service was
held to violate the first amendment.64 Justice Black's vote in this
case, as in others which upheld the rights of people to express
their religious beliefs regardless of the degree of popularity of
those beliefs in the community, was similar to the stance he
maintained during the nineteen-fifties when cases dealing with
personal beliefs and political advocacy came before the Court.
Justice Black staunchly defended the rights of an individual to
believe and speak about religion and politics without being penal-
ized for the content of such speech.
61. 340 U.S. 268 (1951). The appellants in this case applied to a city council for,
permits to use a city park for Bible talks. The permits were denied for no appar-
ent reason other than prejudice. However, appellants conducted their meetings
and were convicted on charges of disorderly conduct, threat of violence or riot, and
for not conducting themselves in a manner beyond reproach. The Supreme Court
held that appellants were denied equal protection of the laws with regard to free-
dom of speech and religion pursuant to the first and fourteenth amendments and
reversed the convictions. Id. at 273.
62. Id. Black described the courts as "havens" for those who suffered because
they were "helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming vic-
tims of prejudice and public excitement." Id. at 241. See also Note, The Roosevelt
Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: Another Look at United States
v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 774-75 (1981).
63. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953). The case demonstrated the
classic situation for denial of equal protection of the laws.
64. Fowler was similar to Niemotko, 310 U.S. 268 (1951). A city ordinance pre-
vented religious meetings in public parks that involved any form of public address.
As in Niemotko, the Supreme Court found a violation of first amendment
guarantees.
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Subsequent to the Fowler decision the Court upheld the convic-
tion of another minister in Poulos v. New Hampshire. 65 Poulos at-
tempted to speak at a religious gathering in a public park despite
the denial of a license for that purpose and was subsequently ar-
rested and fined for the violation. The Supreme Court, over the
objection of Justice Black, upheld the conviction and the ordi-
nance which gave city officials the authority to prohibit the meet-
ing of the Jehovah's Witnesses. 66 Justice Black's dissenting
opinion reaffirmed his position that the state did have the power
to regulate streets for traffic purposes, and therefore, could also
regulate the kind of street parades that were at issue in the early
Cox case. Justice Black also stated that the time, place, and man-
ner of activities in the streets and parks could be regulated. 67 In
the Poulos case, however, Justice Black found an element of arbi-
trariness in the refusal to allow the preacher to speak. He ended
his short dissent with a firm admonition:
... The First Amendment affords freedom of speech a special protection; I
believe it prohibits a state from convicting a man of crime whose only of-
fense is that he makes an orderly religious appeal after he has been ille-
gaily "arbitrarily and unreasonably" denied a "license" to talk. This to me
is a subtle use of a creeping censorship loose in -the land.68
I. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS INVOLVING RELIGION WITHIN
EDUCATIONAL PARAMETERS
A. Transportation of School Children
Educational policy-making by the Supreme Court began to
dominate the Court's activity following the major "Jehovah's Wit-
ness" cases. This subtle shift in first amendment emphasis be-
came even more pronounced after Earl Warren was appointed
Chief Justice, 69 and was especially revealed in the analysis of pol-
65. 345 U.S. 395 (1953). The Court distinguished Poulous from Kunz, 340 U.S.
290 (1951), which involved the complete discretion of officials to refuse licenses.
See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), where the Court said
"[e Iven the exercise of religion may be at some slight inconvenience in order that
the State may protect its citizens from injury." 310 U.S. at 306.
66. Justice Black's dissent referred to the result in Poulos as "a subtle use of a
creeping censorship loose in the land." 345 U.S. at 422.
67. Justice Black distinguished between a man who refused to obtain a license
to start a business or purchase firearms, and the unique quality the first amend-
ment affords freedom of speech and religion. Id. at 421-22.
68. Id. at 422. See supra note 66.
69. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), see also Strickland, supra note
2; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (statute prohibiting teaching of evolu-
tion in public schools held invalid); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
icies dealing with public and parochial schools and religious activ-
ities.70 The Court had already heard a number of questions
pertaining to religion in schools, including the "flag salute" cases
which were decided early in Justice Black's judicial career.7 1
Other cases involved parochial schools and parents who argued
that they were financially penalized by sending their children to
such schools, particularly in their efforts to provide their children
with transportation to and from school72
In New Jersey, lawmakers were successfully influenced to ap-
prove reimbursement to church schools for bus fares. The highly
controversial question of the use of tax money to reimburse par-
ents for students' bus fare to Catholic schools came before the
Court in 1947. Justice Black authored the opinion of the Court in
Everson v. Board of Education73 and meticulously described the
types of state supported activities that were acceptable within the
confines of the first amendment.7 4 These activities included nor-
mal public services ranging from sewage connection to police pro-
tection. The significant common factor used in labeling these
activities as non-infringing was the neutrality of the state in the
exercise of the questioned activity and its even-handed relation-
ship with believers, as well as non-believers. Accordingly, the
transportation of all school children was a service that might be
publicly financed. Justice Black's opinion in Everson was the
product of careful consideration, but the Court was divided on the
issue and four dissenters vigorously attacked Black's judicial rea-
soning, which was based upon a historical analysis interrelated
with his interpretation of the first amendment. 75 In dissent, Jus-
tice Jackson urged that no funds from the public purse could be
channeled for religious purposes, even indirectly, 2 because the
establishment clause was an absolute prohibition of this type of
203 (1963) (reading from Bible at beginning of the school day was found to be reli-
gious practice).
70. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 37 U.S. 421 (1962). See also supra note 3.
71. Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 568 (1940); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
72. See W. MENDELSON, THE SUPREME COURT: LAW AND DISCRETION 576 (1967).
73. 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947). Other acceptable state-supported activities de-
scribed were ordinary police and fire protection as well as maintenance of public
highways and sidewalks.
74. Id. at 18. With regard to the first amendment, the opinion states the
following:
[The First] Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require
the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to
handicap religions than it is to favor them.
Id.
75. The four dissenters in Everson were Justice Jackson, Justice Rutledge,
Justice Frankfurter and Justice Burton.
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disbursement.76
Justice Black and four other justices77 agreed that a high wall of
separation between church and state must be maintained, but
held under the circumstances in Everson that New Jersey had not
breached that wall. Justice Black's intense interest in history
supplied him with a great deal of background knowledge about
early legal dissatisfaction over the intermingling of church and
state, either by law or custom. Protestants, Catholics and Jews
suffered persecution under such systems, and colonial history is
replete with instances in which government-sponsored religions
were forced upon people who desired to determine their own fate,
consequently, the founding fathers drafted the first amendment.
In Everson, Justice Black articulated a black-letter definition of
the establishment clause that listed precisely which activities
would violate the Constitution:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person
to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to pro-
fess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attend-
ance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be lev-
ied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, par-
ticipate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of reli-
gion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between Church
and State."7 8
The Everson opinion classified the transportation of students as
an activity falling within the public welfare. 79 Justice Black main-
tained that providing bus transportation to parochial schools was
similar to police and fire protection.8O Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion was also a landmark case because the establishment clause
of the first amendment was incorporated to the states through the
fourteenth amendment.
76. 330 U.S. at 26-27.
77. Chief Justice Vinson, Justice Douglas, Justice Reed, and Justice Murphy.
78. 330 U.S. at 15-16 (quoting in part Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878)).
79. 330 U.S. at 15-17. The application of the child benefit theory appeared in
cases from 1968 through 1971 which dealt with state aid.
80. Id. at 17.
B. The Use of Public Property for Religious Instruction
Justice Black once again spoke for the Court when it rejected
the practice of allowing religious classes taught by non-public
school faculty instructors during specified hours in public school
buildings. The case of McCollum v. Board of Education,81 which
involved "released time" programs, 82 was decided in 1948. Mrs.
Vashti McCollum, a taxpayer whose child attended a public
school where religious classes were conducted, challenged that
practice as a violation of the establishment clause of the first
amendment. Justice Black, in his majority opinion, supported the
contentions of Mrs. McCollum. 83 The practice of sectarian teach-
ers coming to public schools during school hours each week for
thirty to forty-five minutes of instruction centered on specific reli-
gious doctrines was found to violate the first and fourteenth
amendments.84
The program challenged in McCollum was devised by the
Champaign Council on Religious Education, an inter-religious or-
ganization comprised of Catholics, Protestants and Jews. Parents
signed a card to authorize the enrollment of their children in the
classes and their attendance was thereafter required and ac-
counted for by a report to the regular classroom teachers. The
non-participating students were sent to other sections of the
building for ostensibly secular instruction which was actually no
more than a method of marking time until the religious classes
were dismissed. In order for this type of system to operate effec-
tively, the public school faculty had to cooperate with the visiting
religious personnel.85
Justice Black and the majority agreed that this scheme of
mandatory public school attendance and the use of public prop-
81. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
82. Id. at 223-32. "Released time" programs allowed a child to attend church
classes after public school hours, usually for one afternoon during the week. The
released time movement evolved from the week-day church school. The thrust of
the released time proposals was that the "public school unduly monopolized the
child's time and that the churches were entitled to their share of it." Id. at 222
(Frankfurter, J., separate opinion). Rather than infringing upon the children's
"play time," the church schools sought to reach the children "during what the
child conceived to be his 'business hours."' Id. at 222. See Sorauf, The Impact of a
Supreme Court Decision, in LAw, PomIcs AND THE FEDERAL COURTS (1967).
83. 333 U.S. at 212. The Court said:
Here not only are the State's tax-supported public school buildings used
for the dissemination of religious doctrines. The State also affords sectar-
ian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their reli-
gious classes through the use of the State's compulsory public school
machinery. This is not a separation of Church and State.
Id.
84. Id. at 211.
85. Id. at 207-09.
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erty for religious instruction served to propagate certain religious
sects,8 6 and found that this situation traversed the wall of separa-
tion between church and state. Citing Everson's first amendment
guidelines, Justice Black struck down this religious practice. Al-
though Justice Black used the same rationale in McCollum as in
Everson, he reached a diametrically opposite conclusion. 87
Four years later, in Zorach v. Clauson, 8 8 a case similar to Mc-
Collum, Justice Black was astonished when the Court virtually
ignored his McCollum opinion by allowing schools to schedule
dismissal time during the school day so that children might at-
tend religious classes in nearby churches and other non-public
buildings. Attendance records were required and children who
did not attend denominational religious instruction again had to
mark time during those periods. Justice Black rejected the idea
expressed by Justice Douglas and the majority in Zorach that
such religious instruction did not violate the Constitution because
the people in this country are "a religious people whose institu-
tions presuppose a Supreme Being."89 Based on his awareness of
the historical lessons relating to the abuse of such conjunctive ex-
ercise of government and religion, Justice Black was convinced
that people who desired first amendment protections were the
same people who wanted to keep a wall of separation between
church and government. The released time program in the Zo-
rach case appeared to be based on coercion. Justice Black op-
posed governmental intrusion into religious worship by school
children.
State help to religion injects political and party prejudices into a holy
field. It too often substitutes force for prayer, hate for love, and persecu-
86. The operation of the States's compulsory education system thus as-
sists and is integrated with the program of religious instruction carried on
by separate religious sects. Pupils compelled by law to go to school for
secular education are released in part from their legal duty upon the con-
dition that they attend the religious classes. This is beyond all question a
utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system
to aid religious groups to spread their faith.
Id. at 209-10.
87. See supra note 83, distinguishing Everson and McCollum. The approach is
basically the same: in each case, Justice Black relies upon his definition of the es-
tablishment of religion clause of the first amendment. 330 U.S. at 15-16.
88. 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). In a bitter dissent Justice Black
appeared astonished because to him, the only difference between the two cases
was that the McCollum religious classes were held in the school building, whereas
the Zorach classes were still using the State's machinery for compulsory public
school attendance. Id. at 316.
89. Id. at 313.
tion for persuasion. Government should not be allowed, under cover of
the soft euphemism of "co-operation," to steal into the sacred area of reli-
gious choice. 90
C. School Prayers and Bible Readings
During the Warren era, the most highly publicized and contro-
versial cases regarding the first amendment and religion involved
issues of school prayer and Bible reading.9 1 Numerous amend-
ments were proposed in the United States Congress to overturn
judicial policies. 92 Religious zealots felt that the Supreme Court
had overreacted to the demands of a minority of nonbelievers. 93
Commentators strongly criticized the legal reasoning in school
prayer cases. 94 In the midst of this controversy Justice Black au-
thored what would become an often maligned opinion in Engel v.
Vitale, 95 wherein the Court outlawed a one sentence prayer that
was required by state education policy-makers to be repeated
each morning in the classrooms.
The prayer in Engel was written as follows: "Almighty God, we
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy bless-
ings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country."96 Jus-
tice Black asserted that when school authorities composed any
prayer and required its daily repetition, they violated the policy
behind the establishment clause of the first amendment.9 7 Justice
90. Id. at 320.
91. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
92. Opposition to the prayer decisions led to an enormous mail campaign
demanding that members of Congress introduce constitutional amend-
ments to permit prayer and Bible reading in the public schools. During
the 88th Congress, through the third week of March 1964, 146 proposals for
such constitutional amendments were introduced in the House and sent
to the House Judiciary Committee. A group of House members support-
ing amendments met to join forces behind a single proposal. The result
was the Becker Amendment, named for representative Frank Becker of
New York who had sponsored the first prayer amendment bill in the 88th
Congress.
[1964] Cong. Q. Rep. 881-85.
93. See, e.g., Beaney & Beiser, Prayer and Politics: The Impact of Engel and
Schempp on the Political Process, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
200-17 (1969). W. Mum, JR., PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: LAw AND A'rrrrUDE
CHANGE 115-38 (1967); Johnson, Compliance and Supreme Court Decision-Making,
in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 118-22 (1969); S. WASBY, THE IMPACT
OF THE UNIrED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES 88 (1970); Birkby, The
Supreme Court and the Bible Belt: Tennessee Reaction to the Schempp Decision,
in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 106 (1969).
94. See Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Cour, in THE
SUPREME COURT AND CONSTrrUTIONAL RIGHTS: READINGS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1967).
95. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
96. Id. at 422.
97. Id. at 430.
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Black stated:
The First Amendment was added to the Constitution to stand as a guaran-
tee that neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal Government
would be used to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the
American people can say - that the people's religions must not be sub-
jected to the pressures of government for change each time a new political
administration is elected to office. Under that Amendment's prohibition
against governmental establishment of religion, as reinforced by the provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment, government in this country, be it
state or federal, is without power to prescribe by law any particular form
of prayer which is to be used as an official prayer in carrying on any pro-
gram of governmentally sponsored religious activity.9 8
In Engel, Justice Black elaborated upon his interpretation of
the establishment clause, illustrating a consistency with his posi-
tion in earlier opinions by again emphasizing the heavy restric-
tions placed upon government in its relationships with religious
institutions. Justice Black defined the establishment clause and
its purpose:
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not de-
pend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated
by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether
those laws operated directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not.
This is not to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a particular
form of religious worship do not involve coercion of such individuals.
When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed
behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved reli-
gion is plain. But the purposes underlying the Establishment Clause go
much further than that. Its first and most immediate purpose rested on
the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy govern-
ment and to degrade religion.... Another purpose of the Establishment
Clause rested upon an awareness of the historical fact that governmen-
tally established religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand.9 9
The Justice cited James Madison's warning that governments
which favor the Christian religion in general may eventually de-
cide to condone and authorize one sect of the Christian religion,
even to the point of forcing monetary support of that religion. 0 0
Parents who had brought similar questions before the Court be-
98. Id. at 429-30.
99. Id. at 430-32. Government and religion were closely connected in most of
the colonies and several states after 1776. Rhode Island, Maryland, Virginia, Penn-
sylvania, and Massachusetts led the way toward increased religious freedom in
this country before the Bill of Rights was ratified. ABERNATHY, CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNDER THE CONSTrruTIoN 272-74 (1977).
100. 370 U.S. at 436. Madison warned against the intermingling of Church and
State. (Justice Black derives this warning from J. Madison, Memorial and Remon-
strance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183,
185-86 (1901)).
cause of a dissatisfaction with public school policies regarding
religious devotions, saw the Engel victory in the Supreme Court
as reason to be optimistic when their cases were reviewed by the
Court a short time later. Their optimism was justified when the
Court held in Abington School District v. SchempplO that recita-
tion of the Lord's Prayer and the reading of ten Bible verses by
public school children were unconsitutional. The students in this
case were given the opportunity to excuse themselves from the
classroom, but in the view of the Court that was not enough to le-
gitimize the early morning devotions conducted for the rest of the
students who either condoned the exercises or passively accepted
them. Justice Black had previously supported the interpretation
of the Court that such practices violate the establishment
clause. 02 Justice Clark wrote the majority opinion "with consider-
ably less bluntness, and much more of an eye toward soothing the
public,"103 propounding the easy logic of having the state assume
a position of neutrality.l0 4
In 1952, Donald Doremus filed a taxpayer suit questioning the
constitutionality of a daily school Bible reading authorized by a
New Jersey law. In Doremus v. Board of Education,10 5 the Court
held that the taxpayer lacked standing to sue.10 6 The student had
not been compelled to participate or even stay in the room while
the Bible was being read.l07 Justice Black agreed with the major-
ity which held that the case was not justiciable since no actual in-
jury was shown.
101. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
102. Although Justice Black authored no opinion in the Abington decision, his
rationale regarding application of the establishment clause to school prayer articu-
lated in Engel, see supra notes 95400 and accompanying text, was utilized exten-
sively by the majority in support of its conclusion to strike a mandatory prayer
and Bible reading.
103. H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDIcIARY: THE SUPREME COURT IN THE GOVERNMENTAL
PROCESS 101 (1980).
[I]t might well be said that one's education is not complete without a
study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship
to the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible
is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have
said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when
presented as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected
consistently with the First Amendment.
374 U.S. at 225.
104. 374 U.S. at 222.
105. 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
106. " his Court has held that the interests of a taxpayer in the moneys of the
federal treasury are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain and indirect to furnish
a basis for an appeal to the preventive powers of the Court over their manner of
expenditure." Id. at 433.
107. The appeal was dismissed because there was no finding that the taxpayer
had the requisite interest and injury necessary for standing in a taxpayer case. Id.
at 434-35.
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Unlike the great debate that developed among citizens and
members of Congress following the Engel and Schempp deci-
sions, the Doremus opinion attracted little public attention. The
general public outcry and a legislative flurry in Congress l0 8 did
not discourage the Court in the succeeding several years from
considering subsequent questions involving governmental and
religious policy-making in the educational field.
D. Direct Aid to Parochial Schools
Tax money allocations to support phases of private and paro-
chial school systems were a source of conflict in different locali-
ties, and, as in Everson,109 were a basic issue leading to the
instigation of litigation. In Flast v. Cohen, 110 Florence Flast al-
leged that tax money allocations for educational materials in pa-
rochial schools violated the Constitution. Thus posed, the
persistent question of whether a taxpayer could contest expendi-
tures of a governmental agency was reconsidered by the Supreme
Court in 1968. With Chief Justice Warren as its spokesman, and
Justice Black joining the majority in a landmark decision, the
Court found standing on the part of the taxpayer.1 1
The Flast decision effectively nullified the case of Frothingham
v. Mellon 112 without formally overruling it. Frothingham was a
politically oriented case in which the Court ruled that a federal
taxpayer lacked standing to question whether Congress had in-
vaded state powers guaranteed by the tenth amendment. The
Court held that the complaining litigant failed to show a direct in-
jury as a result of the federal maternity law.113
On the same day Flast was decided, the Supreme Court, in
Board of Education of Central School District v. Allen, 114 handed
down a decision concerning a state law that authorized purchase
of textbooks for parochial and private schools at state expense.
According to the majority, the statute under scrutiny did not of-
fend the Constitution. 1 5 Justice Black wrote a dissenting opinion
108. M. ABERNATHY, CIVIL LIBERTIES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 275 (1968).
109. See supra note 73.
110. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
111. Id. at 106.
112. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
113. The Court held that if the defendant had been able to show an injury,
there would be a "justiciable controversy." Id. at 480.
114. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
115. Id. at 245-48.
in which he called the law:
[A] flat, flagrant, open violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
which together forbid Congress or state legislatures to enact any law "re-
specting an establishment of religion...." This, I am confident, would be in
keeping with the deliberate statement we made in Everson v. Board of Ed-
ucation ... and repeated in People of State of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Education.... 116
The Justice detected governmental compulsion in using tax funds
to buy textbooks for parochial schools. He pointed out that where
certain religious groups were politically strong, they could have a
predominant influence upon the type of laws concerning under-
writing costs of religious educational endeavors. He labeled such
efforts as "insidious approaches that the citadels of liberty are
most successfully attacked." 7
Justice Black was dismayed to see his Everson opinion cited by
the lower court judges as authority in the "textbook" cases." 8 He
failed to see any parallels between bus fares for students, and
textbooks furnished to parochial schools. According to Justice
Black, books are the heart of the educational system. Propaganda
and religious viewpoints are transmitted through books, while rid-
ing on buses to and from school did not affect a child's religious
belief one way or another. Justice Black asserted that the estab-
lishment clause had been violated where the state was underwrit-
ing traditional educational costs of parochial schools. It was his
belief that the religious peace in the country would be in jeopardy
if the trend of allocation of public tax funds continued to be
earmarked for private sectarian purposes." 9
116. Id. at 250 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 252.
118. See Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (plaintiffs sued
Board of Education and their members for declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief because of Board's permission and sponsorship of Bible study and instruc-
tion in city and county elementary schools; Bible study program constituted an ex-
cessive entanglement between government and religion); Wolman v. Essex, 417 F.
Supp. 1113 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (Ohio statute made certain services and materials
available to non-public schools; Court held that secular materials were incapable
of diversion to religious use); Commission for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Levitt, 342 F. Supp. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (New York statute authorizing payment of
certain public funds to non-public schools held unconstitutional where school im-
posed religious restrictions on admissions, required attendance of all pupils at
religious activities, and was integral part of the religious mission of the supporting
church); Protestants, Etc. United for Separation of Church and State v. United
States, 435 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1970) (an action to enjoin a law authorizing federal
grants for library and instructional materials for parochial schools, lower court
granted summary judgment for defendants; decision reversed and remanded by
United States Court of Appeals).
119. "The First Amendment's prohibition against governmental establishment
of religion was written on the assumption that state aid to religion and religious
schools generates discord, disharmony, hatred, and strife among our people, and
that any government that supplies such aids is to that extent a tyranny." Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 254 (1968).
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In Lemon v. Kurtzman,120 the Court invalidated state statutes
that authorized financial supplements to parochial school teach-
ers out of public funds. Justice Black joined in the concurring
opinion of Justice Douglas. 2 1 The teachers taught secular sub-
jects, but were under state scrutiny to ensure that the specified
standards were observed. The Lemon majority viewed the ar-
rangement as an impermissible entanglement of state and church
activities.122
The concurring opinion by Justice Douglas presented statistics
illustrating the degree of state involvement in the parochial edu-
cation field within Catholic parishes. 12 3 Justice Douglas pointed
out that many of the parochial schools were founded in the nine-
teenth century because of dissension and conflict over what reli-
gious instruction could be introduced into the public school
system. His opinion noted that, for years, the custom had been to
ban the use of tax money to promote parochial school activities,
but that the rule had gradually changed until nine billion tax dol-
lars were being funneled into sectarian schools in any one year.
A form of surveillance by state government was already in effect
because of the transfer of money from the public purse to the
church treasury for other endeavors. The amount of policing re-
quired if parochial teacher salaries became supplemented by
state tax funds would necessarily increase. If taxpayers would
begin to pay for part or all of the expenses of private parochial
school programs, then prayers, the content of the curriculum, and
discussions within the classrooms of schools supporting sectarian
ideas would all be subject to censure. However, because the pur-
pose of a parochial school is to teach specific religious doctrine,
religiously zealous teachers would be capable of implementing
church dogma in even the most neutral subjects. State officials
attempting to enforce secular educational norms and ensure that
the parochial teachers and school administrators abided by secu-
lar guidelines would create dissension which could eventually
lead to open academic conflict. A teacher who disregarded the
secular approach would be accountable to the religious hierarchy
who placed religious instruction in a primary position. If teachers
120. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
121. 403 U.S. at 625. Justices Black and Douglas had also agreed in Engel v.
Vitale. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) Black authored the opinion; Douglas concurred.
122. Id. at 609.
123. Id. at 630 n.13.
who taught most of the secular subjects in religious schools were
subsidized by the state, the result would be that government, in
effect, would be underwriting a substantial portion of the school's
budget. This would leave the small remainder financed by the
church to be channeled for the promotion of a particular faith.124
The Court agreed that such an arrangement negated the first
amendment and ignored the intent of the founding fathers.125
Justice Black supported Douglas' concurring opinion in Lemon. 126
Douglas and Black were both strongly opposed to state funding of
church school activities.
On the same day that the Lemon decision was announced, the
Court decided Tilton v. Richardson,127 a case considering paro-
chial colleges and the federal financing of construction of build-
ings specified for secular puposes at such colleges for the
buildings' first twenty years. A majority of the justices reasoned
that there was no violation of the first amendment.128 Justice
Douglas authored the dissent and Justices Black and Marshall
concurred with the opinion.129 The Tilton case differed from Ever-
son in that the monetary aid given at public expense went di-
rectly to the student and was therefore classified as indirect state
aid of religion. Erecting expensive buildings on a parochial school
campus where the federal government paid up to half the cost,
however, constituted direct aid to a religious instrument. Federal
124. Id. at 640-41.
125. "[T]he use of taxpayers' money to support parochial schools violated the
First Amendment, applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth." Id.
126. Id. at 625-42.
127. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
128. The simplistic argument that every form of financial aid to church-
sponsored activitiy violates the Religion Clauses was rejected long ago in
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).... The crucial question is not
whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution as a consequence
of the legislative program, but whether its principal or primary effect ad-
vances religion....
The Act itself was carefully drafted to ensure that the federally subsi-
dized facilities would be devoted to the secular and not the religious func-
tion of the recipient institutions.
Id. at 679.
129. Justice Douglas wrote the dissent, with Justices Black and Marshall con-
curring in separate dissenting opinions.
The plurality's distinction is in effect that small violations of the First
Amendment over a period of years are unconstitutional ... while a huge vi-
olation occurring only once is de minimus. I cannot agree with such
sophistry.
[A) parochial school operates on one budget. Money not spent for one
purpose becomes available for other purposes. Thus the fact that there
are no religious observances in federally financed facilities is not control-
ling because required religious observance will take place in other
buildings.
Id. at 693.
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law provided for the buildings to become the property of the paro-
chial college only after twenty years, and the dissenters felt that
such an arrangement violated the establishment clause. 130 It
would be impossible to assure that sectarian activities would
never be introduced into any such buildings on a church-super-
vised college campus. Even if all activities held within the
financed buildings actually were restricted to secular activities,
the government grant made it possible for the enhanced budget of
the institution to be directed toward structures used for religious
purposes.1 3 1 This, of course, would be in contravention of the ba-
sic constitutional premise that any federally subsidized activity
must be governed by federal laws. This is represented by the ban
on prayer required by the Engel decision,132 which made opera-
tive the establishment and free exercise clause.
For Justices Douglas and Black, the Tilton decision created a
problem involving state authorities enforcing their policies upon
the church, thereby necessitating a constant state examination of
the use of the buildings. The two justices warned of the increas-
ing wealth of churches, the ever-enlarging intrusion of church
financed enterprises into the secular business world, and the pre-
ferred position of church property as a result of the tax exemp-
tion.133 They cautioned that the trend could not continue without
causing unacceptable governmental intrusion into sectarian activ-
ity.134 Justice Douglas, with Justice Black's approval, concluded
that "[t]he million-dollar grants sustained today put Madison's
miserable 'three pence' to shame. But [Madison] even thought,
as [Justices Douglas and Black did], that even a small amount
coming out of the pocket of taxpayers and going into the coffers of
a church was not in keeping with our constitutional ideal."135
E. Regulation of Student and Teacher Expression
A study of Justice Black's judicial interpretation of the first
amendment should necessarily include his remarks regarding the
content of discussions led by teachers and the role students play
130. 403 U.S. at 683.
131. Id. at 680-81.
132. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
133. "The religiously used real estate of the churches today constitutes a vast
domain.... Their assets total over $141 billion and their annual income at least $22
billion." 403 U.S. at 696 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 714).
134. 403 U.S. at 697.
135. Id. at 697.
in the public classroom. Justice Black's definite ideas relating to
the regulation of student-teacher expression emerged in his opin-
ions and his votes in cases concerning school administrative pol-
icy, school policy-makers, teachers and students. In 1940, Justice
Black took the position in Minersville School District v. Gobitis136
that children could be punished if they rebelled against school au-
thorities and refused to salute the flag, even if it violated their
religious principles. 13v The following year, in Jones v. Opelika, 138
Justice Black admitted that Minersville was incorrectly decided
and later voted to overturn that decision.l3 9
In the Vietnam War era, Justice Black was unimpressed by the
student's reasons for wearing black armbands during school
hours in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist. 140
136. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
137. 310 U.S. at 598-99. Speaking for the majority, Justice Frankfurter upheld
the expulsion of two children, practicing Jehovah's Witnesses, from a Penn-
sylvania public school on the ground that the court should not exercise censorship
over a legislative program designed to promote traditional ideals of democracy in
public schools. In Justice Stone's dissenting opinion, he stated that the Constitu-
tion did not demand that "compulsory expressions of loyalty play any such part in
our scheme of government as to override the consitutional protection of freedom
of speech and religion." Id. at 605. The majority opinion was subject to considera-
ble criticism by commentators. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Law - Compulsory
Flag Salute Sustained, 18 N.Y.U. L. REV. 124 (1940-41).
138. 316 U.S. 584 (1942). In Opelika the issue was the constitutionality of city
license taxes in Alabama, Arkansas and Arizona on the sale of printed materials.
The petitioners were Jehovah's Witnesses who were convicted of violating the var-
ious ordinances for not possessing the required licenses. A divided Court (5-4),
upheld the license taxes against freedom of religion, speech and press challenges.
Id. at 598. Justice Stone again dissented. Id. at 600-11. In a separate dissent, Jus-
tice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Murphy, admitted that the Minersville
case had been incorrectly decided and stated that the "Bill of Rights, has a high
responsiblity to accommodate itself to the religious views of minorities, however
unpopular and unorthodox those views may be." Id. at 624. For a discussion of
Opelika, see Note, Use of Taxation and Licensing in the Suppression of Freedom
of Religion and the Press, 52 YALE LJ. 168 (1942).
139. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The ma-
jority opinion, written by Justice Jackson, upheld the district court opinion which
restrained enforcement against members of the Jehovah's Witness faith of a West
Virginia State Board of Education resolution requiring that students in public
schools salute the national flag under threat of expulsion. The Court explicitly
overruled Minersville and held that the compulsory flag salute violated the princi-
ples and freedoms of the first amendment. Id. at 642. Justice Black concurred,
stating that a statute compelling children to salute the flag in violation of their reli-
gious principles becomes a "handy implement for disguised religious persecution."
Id. at 644. The "flag-salute" cases have elicited extensive commentary. See Note,
Constitutional Implications of Compulsory Flag Salute Statutes, 12 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 70 (1943).
140. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The Court held that a school policy requiring suspen-
sion of any student refusing to remove a black armband signifying disaproval of
the Vietnam War was an unconstitutional denial of the students' right of expres-
sion. Id. at 514. In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Black relied upon the testi-
mony of school authorities in stating that the students, who wore armbands in
violation of school policy were engaging in a practice which distracted other stu-
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Rather, he relied on the school authorities' testimony that the few
students who wore the armbands were engaging in a practice that
distracted other students. Although the students in Tinker were
children of a Methodist minister, the issue was not one of religion,
but of speech.141 Justice Black rejected the idea that symbolic
speech was on the same level with pure speech.142 In his dissent-
ing opinion in Tinker, Justice Black emphatically rejected an ab-
solute freedom of speech for teachers who taught at either the
primary or secondary levels:
The truth is that a teacher of kindergarten, grammar school, or high school
pupils no more carries into a school with him a complete right to freedom
of speech and expression than an anti-Catholic or anti-Semitic carries
with him a complete freedom of speech and religion into a Catholic
church or Jewish synagogue.... It is a myth to say that any person has
a constitutional right to say what he pleases, where he pleases, and when
he pleases .... In my view, teachers in state controlled public schools
are hired to teach there ... certainly a teacher is not paid to go into school
and teach subjects the State does not hire him to teach as a part of its se-
lected curriculum. Nor are public school students sent to the schools at
public expense to broadcast political or any other views to educate and in-
form the public. 14 3
One year prior to Tinker, a teacher challenged an Arkansas law
that forbade teaching evolution in public schools in the case of
Epperson v. Arkansas. 144 The Supreme Court, with Justice Black
concurring, voided the historically effective anti-evolution stat-
ute.145 Justice Black's vote was welcomed, but remarks in his
dents. Id. at 517-18. To Justice Black, allowing students this type of freedom of
expression would compel "teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surren-
der control of the American public school system to public school students." Id. at
526.
141. The Court stated that the problem involves direct, primary first amend-
ment rights akin to "pure speech" which, according to the Court, "is entitled to
comprehensive protection under the First Amendment." Id. at 505-06. See Ad-
derly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). See aLso
Divine, A Note on Tinker, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 539 (1971).
142. Relying upon Justice McKenna's opinion in Waugh v. Mississippi Univ.,
237 U.S. 589 (1915), Justice Black analogized the "armband" situation to the opin-
ion in Waugh which held that the states' public schools have the right to curtail
freedom of assembly when it interrupted the educational process. 393 U.S. at 522-
24.
143. 393 U.S. at 521-22 (citations omitted).
144. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Under the anti-evolution statute in question, it was un-
lawful for a teacher in a state supported school to teach the Darwinian theory, or
to use a textbook which taught that theory. A conviction under the statute re-
sulted in a misdemeanor fine and dismissal. AR. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1627, 80-1628
(1960).
145. Justice Fortas wrote the majority opinion. Justices Black, Stewart and
Harlan concurred separately.
concurring opinion overshadowed his vote. The case centered
upon an unenforced law challenged by a school teacher and par-
ents of certain children in the teacher's school. The law had
never been enforced. Thus Black wrote, "I am by no means sure
that this case presents a genuinely justiciable case or contro-
versy."l46 Since the teacher was no longer in this profession, and
the students were no longer in the school system, Justice Black
thought the lawsuit should perhaps be dismissed as moot. Ulti-
mately, however, Justice Black voted to strike down the statute
on grounds of vagueness. 147
The majority voided the statute involved in Epperson because
they believed it violated the establishment clause.148 Justice
Black thought that the subject of evolution was controversial and
that school policy-makers had the right to withdraw from the
school's curriculum controversial subjects.149 He felt that the
Court, by denying school authorities the ability to exclude the
teaching of evolution, infringed on "the religious freedom of those
who consider evolution an anti-religious doctrine.' I50 In this situ-
ation, the Supreme Court was apparently ignoring the first
amendment norm of state neutrality. Justice Black displayed his
attitude toward public education and academic freedom when he
stated that:
I am also not ready to hold that a person hired to teach school children
takes with him into the classroom a constitutional right to teach sociologi-
cal, economic, political, or religious subjects that the school's managers do
not want discussed .... I question whether it is absolutely certain, as the
Court's opinion indicates, that "academic freedom" permits a teacher to
breach his contractual agreement to teach only the subjects designated by
the school authorities who hired him. 151
The Justice rejected the notion of the Supreme Court supervising
the curriculum on the state and local levels, just as he condemned
146. 393 U.S. at 109. The Arkansas anti-evolution statute had not been enforced
during its 40 years on the books. The evidence did not show that the teacher who
brought the action, seeking a declaratory judgment, was currently teaching in the
Arkansas school system, nor did it show that the intervenor's sons, students in the
Arkansas public schools, were taught the Darwinian theory. Id. at 109-10.
147. Justice Black believed that by holding the statute unconstitutional on
grounds of vagueness, the Court would not only be following precedent and avoid-
ing the task of determining the scope of state law, but would also avoid violating
the principle that the States are "absolutely free to choose their own curriculums
for their own schools so long as their action does not palpably conflict with a clear
constitutional command." Id. at 112.
148. The Court held that the statute violated the principles of religious neutral-
ity required by the state in accordance with the first amendment. Id. at 109.
149. Justice Black took issue with the majority's holding that Arkansas sought
to exclude the evolution theory from public education because it was contrary to
the Book of Genesis. Justice Black felt that the State may exercise its right to
withdraw material from school curriculum if it was controversial. Id. at 112-13.
150. 393 U.S. at 113.
151. Id. at 113-14.
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the Court's policy-making in first amendment obscenity cases. 152
Despite Justice Black's disagreement with the Court's supervi-
sion of activities in the classroom, he played a significant role in
deciding that educational policies designating school authorized
prayer,15 3 the Lord's prayer,154 and Bible reading 5 5 violated the
first amendment. Justice Black stated that school authorities
could not designate release time for religious studies taught in
public school buildings156 or in other nearby buildings.15 7 As to
fiscal matters, he approved an allocation of tax funds for the
transportation of parochial school students since it was the child
who was benefiting and not the church.158 However, he took a dif-
ferent stance when tax money was allocated for textbooks,159
school buildings on parochial campuses, 160 and teacher salaries in
152. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting); Ginz-
burg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); Bantam Books v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (Black, J., concurring); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957) (Douglas and Black, JJ., dissenting). See also Magrath, The Obscenity
Cases: The Grapes of Roth, 1966 SuP. CT. REV. 7.
153. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). See Sutherland, Establishment Accord-
ing to Engel, 76 HARv. L REV. 25 (1962).
154. Murray v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). In an opinion by Justice Clark, a
rule promulgated by the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore requiring
the reading of a chapter of the Bible and/or the Lord's Prayer was held to violate
the establishment clause. Justice Black voted with the majority.
155. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Schempp was a
companion case to Murray; both opinions were written by Justice Clark with Jus-
tice Black voting with the majority. A similar Bible-reading/Lord's Prayer rule in
Schempp was held unconstitutional on the same grounds as in Murray. See supra
note 154.
156. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
157. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (statute did not constitute establish-
ment of religion within meaning of first amendment). Justice Black dissented on
the basis of his opinion in McCollum. See Reed, Church-State and the Zorach
Case, 27 NoTRE DAME LAW. 529 (1952).
158. Everson v. Board of Educ. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See Choper, The Establishment
Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L REV. 260 (1968).
159. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The majority opinion, written
by Justice White, held that a New York statute requiring school districts to lend
textbooks to all public, private and parochial students did not violate the estab-
lishment or free exercise clauses of the first amendment. Justice Black dissented,
stating that a state law requiring the use of tax funds to buy books for parochial
schools was a "fiat, flagrant, [and] open violation" of the establishment clause. Id.
at 250. Distinguishing his Everson opinion, Justice Black believed that a statute
which allowed public taxes to be used to buy books for parochial students "bodes
nothing but evil to religious peace in this country." Id. at 254. See Note, Constitu-
tional Law -Establishment Clause of the First Amendment - Free Textbook
Loans to Pupils in Private Schools Held Constitutiona 37 FoRDHAM L REV. 123
(1969).
160. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). At issue in Tilton was the ques-
parochial schools.161
Educational policy-making by Justice Black and his ideas about
students, teachers, curriculum, early morning devotions, and the
use of tax money reflected several aspects. of his personal back-
ground. In his youth he attended a country school where the se-
verity of discipline sometimes exceeded the nature of the
mischief. Yet he respected teachers and administrators in the
small schools he attended in Alabama. 62 It seems likely that Jus-
tice Black's opinions about academic freedom and student ex-
pression of unpopular ideas may have had their roots in the old-
fashioned approach to education that he had experienced as a
child.163
IV. RECURRING CONFLICTS IN THE CHURCH-STATE CONTEXT
A. Sunday Closing Laws
A comparison of Justice Black's position in cases dealing with
tion of federal building and construction aid for church-related colleges and uni-
versities under Title I of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, Pub. L. No.
88-204, 77 Stat. 363, codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 711-721 (Supp. 1974). The
Act specifically excluded federal funding for church-related purposes of the
schools. 20 U.S.C. § 751(a)(2)(c) (1964 & Supp. IV). The appellants were citizens
and taxpayers in the state of Connecticut. They brought suit seeking injunctive
relief, contending that four church-related colleges and universities were receiving
federal funding under Title I. The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger,
held that the Higher Education Facilities Act did not violate the free exercise or
establishment clauses except for § 754(b) (2), which placed a 20-year limitation on
the religious use restriction in § 751(a) (2). 403 U.S. at 689. Justice Black joined in
a concurring and dissenting opinion written by Justice Douglas, which stated that
invalidation of the religious use limitation clause did not "cure the consitutional
infirmities of the statute as a whole." Id. at 692. See Giannella, Lemon and Tilton:
The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglemen 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 147.
See also supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
161. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon involved the constitution-
ality of two state statutes. The Pennsylvania statute provided reimbursement to
parochial schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks and materials used in connec-
tion with teaching specific secular subjects. PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 24, §§ 5601-609
(Supp. 1971) (repealed 1977). The Rhode Island statutes provided salary supple-
ments to teachers of secular subjects in church-related schools. R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 16-51-1 et seq. (Supp. 1970) (repealed 1980).
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, held that both state stat-
utes were invalid under the establishment clause. 403 U.S. at 613-14. Justice Black
joined in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion. Justice Douglas felt that the sur-
veillance necessary to enforce the religious restrictions in the state statutes con-
stituted an excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 627. See
supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text. Both the majority and concurring
opinions carefully distinguished the case of Walz v. Tax. Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970), wherein the Court held that tax exemptions for places of religious worship
did not violate the establishment clause. See also infra note 202.
162. Justice Black attended a semi-public academy in Ashland, Alabama. See
G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 88-91 (1977). See also Black
Reminisces, 18 ALA. L. REV. 3 (1965-66).
163. See Dunne, supra note 162, at 89-90.
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the juxtaposition of work-days and church laws provides an inter-
esting contrast. Religious beliefs often make it difficult for indi-
viduals to work with clear consciences on the day designated as a
holy one, particularly in the case of members of the Hebrew faith.
The first cases to reach the Supreme Court concerning Jewish liti-
gants and their observance of the Jewish sabbath day were de-
cided in 1961.164 The problem concerned Sunday closing laws,
which were enforced to the point that Jews who normally ob-
served a sabbath on Saturday instead of Sunday, and who were in
retail business, were financially penalized. Four cases were re-
markably similar, and Justice Black indicated by his position in
those cases that Sunday closing laws did not invade the constitu-
tional rights of the Jewish litigants. 165 Justice Black concluded
that concepts of due process, equal protection, lack of free exer-
cise of religion, or establishment of religion could not be relied
upon to strike down these laws. The ostensible legislative pur-
pose of Sunday closing laws was to provide citizens one day each
week for rest and relaxation16 6 and the majority of the Court, in-
cluding Justice Black, found that purpose acceptable and within
the bounds of the Constitution.167
Under the Sunday closing laws, Jewish citizens were left in the
precarious position of either closing their businesses on Saturday
and Sunday, thereby incurring heavy financial losses, or remain-
ing open for business on Saturdays, a practice which would di-
rectly conflict with their principles of faith.168 A second problem
was the inability to shop for a period of two consecutive days for
specially prepared foods required by Jewish dietary laws. This
inconvenience would occur whenever the kosher businesses
could not economically stay open for a short period of time on
Sunday, as permitted by some states.169 Justice Black supported
Chief Justice Warren's reasoning when he wrote that, despite the
fact that Sunday closing laws stemmed from religious dictates,
164. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Two
Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
165. See supra note 164. Sunday closing laws (so called "blue laws") are those
laws and ordinances in many jurisdictions which prohibit businesses from operat-
ing on Sunday. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 157 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
166. 366 U.S. at 425-28.
167. The Court held a uniform day of rest is a legitimate government goal for
the purposes of the due process and equal protection clauses. Id.
168. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. at 601.
169. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. at 619.
they were secular in actuality, and did not affect beliefs or opin-
ion. He concluded that the burden placed on the exercise of a
person's religion by the imposition of such laws was indirect.170
Abraham Braunfeld's first amendment interpretation differed
from the court interpretation. He believed it was his duty to obey
God and refrain from doing business from sundown on Friday to
Saturday evening. Braunfeld also believed that he was obligated
to obey the state and close his store on Sunday.171 The result of
this conflict was the financial loss of his investment. A similar
case had been earlier decided involving a young Jehovah's Wit-
ness who was also financially penalized by a state law against
selling literature upon the streets. In the earlier case of Prince v.
Massachusetts, 172 a law forbade children under eighteen years
from selling literature on the streets. The Supreme Court disre-
garded the petitioner's argument that she had violated the law in
order to practice religion.173 Although Justice Black simply voted
to support Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Braunfeld v. Brown.
the content of a subsequent letter indicates that he seemed to ac-
cept Warren's historical analysis dealing with Sunday closing
laws. In a letter to Edmond Cahn in 1961, he stated:
As you are aware, probably no two justices would write precisely the
same opinion in any single case. I thought the Chief did a very good job in
showing the historical changes that had occurred in the basis for Sunday
legislation throughout the years. Certainly if his historical summary of
the laws in question is correct, one could say that those laws do not at-
tempt to establish any religion. So far as the free exercise of religion is
concerned, they would have to be approached differently if they required
people to work in violation of the commands of their religion. 1
74
Two years later, the precise question Justice Black posed in his
letter to Edmond Cahn was brought before the Supreme Court in
Sherbert v. Verner. 175 Interestingly, Justice Black was in the ma-
jority when the Court decided the plight of a person who was
financially penalized because she asserted religious reasons for
not working on Saturday. Adell Sherbert was a member of the
Seventh Day Adventist Church, and since she refused to work on
Saturday because of religious limitations, she was unable to se-
cure employment. The situation was complicated further when
170. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. at 606.
171. Id. at 601.
172. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
173. Id. at 167-71.
174. Letter from Hugo L. Black to Mr. Edmond Cahn (April 3, 1964), Black ifies,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
175. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Adell Sherbert, a textile worker, was employed by
Sparton Milis, Beaumont Division, for approximately 35 years. When the work
week was extended to include Saturday employment, she failed to report for work
for six successive Saturdays and was subsequently discharged. Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737 (1962).
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she was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation
because she would not accept employment that required her to
work on her religious day of worship.176 The Supreme Court de-
cided that the denial of unemployment compensation for the peti-
tioner amounted to a violation of the free exercise clause177 since
the state failed to show a legitimate interest which outweighed
Ms. Sherbert's right to practice her belief. The denial of unem-
ployment benefits was held to be unconstitutional.178
The Braunfeld and Sherbert cases were similar in that both liti-
gants were penalized for observation of their particular days of
worship. Justice Black's 1961 letter to Cahn, quoted in part above,
concisely explained why Sherbert's plea was acceptable to Black,
while arguments by earlier litigants of the Jewish faith had failed
176. The South Carolina Unemployment Conpensation Act, S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 68-1-404 (Law Co-op. 1962), provided in pertinent part that:
§ 68-114. Disqualification for benefits. - Any insured worker shall be ineli-
gible for benefits: ... (3) Failure to accept work. - (a) If the Commission
finds that he has failed, without good cause, (i) either to apply for avail-
able suitable work, when so directed by the employment office or the
Commission, (ii) to accept available suitable work when offered him by
the employment office or the employer or (iii) to return to his customary
self-employment (if any) when so directed by the Commission, such ineli-
gibility shall continue for a period of five weeks....
Id.
South Carolina expressly protected the Sunday worshipper from having to make
a choice analogous to the one in Sherbert where the Court held that making Satur-
day a mandatory work day infringed the Sabbatarian's religious liberty. Even in
times of national emergency, when the textile plants are authorized by the State
Commissioner of Labor to operate on Sunday:
no employee shall be required to work on Sunday ... who is conscien-
tiously opposed to Sunday work; and if any employee should refuse to
work on Sunday on account of conscientious or physical objections he or
she shall not jeopardize his or her seniority by such refusal or be discrimi-
nated against in any other manner.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 64-4 (Law Co-op. 1962) (emphasis added). In this respect, dis-
qualification of a Sunday worshipper for benefits is not likely to arise since an em-
ployer would not discharge the employee in violation of the statutory language.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
177. The Court recognized that:
This holding but reaffirms a principle that we announced a decade and a
half ago, namely that no State may "exclude individual Catholics, Luther-
ans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyter-
ians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it,
from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation."
374 U.S. at 410 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (emphasis
in original)).
178. 374 U.S. at 410. The Court emphasized that the state interest asserted in
Sherbert was "wholly dissimilar to the interests which were found to justify the
less direct burden upon religious practices in Braunfeld...." Id. at 408.
to convince him that their constitutional rights were being
violated.
B. Conscientious Objectors
During the period that Justice Black served on the High Court,
American fighting forces engaged in combat in World War H, the
Korean War, and the Vietnam War. During these conflicts, the
general population expected a willingness on the part of eligible
men to serve in the armed forces. Oaths to support the Constitu-
tion became a common part of the routine of obtaining employ-
ment or entering a profession. Sometimes religious scruples
prevented individuals from taking such oaths or serving in the
armed forces. Several cases illustrated Justice Black's concern
over the conflict of individual religious scruples and governmental
requirements. 179
In re Summers180 involved a Quaker who planned to practice
law in Illinois but was denied admission to the bar because of the
state's fear that a Quaker's oath to use force to protect the state
constitution could not be relied upon due to the Quaker's reli-
gious principles. The Court upheld the denial of admission. Jus-
tice Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he expressed his
belief that a conscientious objector had the right to think, believe,
and worship without being penalized.18 1 In 1955, a Jehovah's Wit-
ness found a more receptive Court when he claimed to be a con-
scientious objector and thus failed to appear when he was
drafted. Accordingly, Justice Black was among the majority in
Sicurella v. United States182 who concluded that the decisions by
the selective service appeal board and the lower federal courts
holding the petitioner as a "draft dodger" were erroneous. Justice
Black did not use the first amendment as a basis for relief even
though the petitioner was found to be motivated by religious
179. See hifta note 180.
180. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945). The Court emphasized:
It is impossible for us to conclude that ... Illinois' interpretation of that
oath to require a willingness to perform military service violates the prin-
ciples of religious freedom which the Fourteenth Amendment secures
against state action, when a like interpretation of a similar oath as to the
Federal Constitution bars an alien from national citizenship.
Id. at 573 (citing United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931)); see also United
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
181. Justice Black vehemently argued that a state should not be allowed to "bar
from a semi-public position a wel-qualifled man of good character solely because
he entertains a religious belief...." 325 U.S. at 578 (Black, J., dissenting).
182. 348 U.S. 385 (1955). The selective service appeal board had determined
that Sicurella would "fight under some circumstances, namely in defense of his
ministry, Kingdom Interests, and in defense of his fellow brethren." Id. at 392.
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ideals.183
Justice Black's opinion in Welsh v. United States184 received
support from Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, and over-
turned the conviction of a conscientious objector whose objec-
tions were based upon moral standards rather than upon religious
beliefs. Constitutional religious issues were omitted in Justice
Black's opinion, and instead he based his reasoning on the previ-
ous case of United States v. Seeger, which allowed conscientious
objection without a true belief in God.185 Justice Black noted the
similarities of the two cases and compared the backgrounds of
both litigants. He found that although Seeger and Welsh were
reared in a religious environment, they did not carry into their
adult lives a continuation of church affiliation. They both regis-
tered for the draft and later decided they could not bring them-
selves to fight in a war. When they filled out the application for a
draft deferment which required a statement of reasons why they
were conscientious objectors, neither could sign the standard
form because they could not honestly base their objection upon
their religious training or a belief in a Supreme Being.186 Both
young men altered that part of the form in order to be truthful
about the source of their pacifist beliefs. Ethical considerations
183. Id. at 391; cf. Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955) (failure to pro-
vide conscientious objector with fair resume of all adverse information in Federal
Bureau of Investigation report deprived him of "hearing" provided by § 6(j) of the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1981)).
184. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). Both the Welsh case and United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965), involved a judicial interpretation of § 6(j) of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958) which provided in perti-
nent part:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to
be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the
United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscien-
tiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and
belief in this connection means an individual's belief in relation to a
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philo-
sophical views or a merely personal moral code.
Id. (emphasis added). Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 1(7) 81 Stat. 100 (1967) subsequently
struck out the provision that religious training and belief stem from the individ-
ual's belief in a relation to a "Supreme Being." See 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1970
ed.).
185. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). In Seeger, the Court explicitly adopted the following
test for evaluating conscientious objector claims: "A sincere and meaningful belief
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God
of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory defi-
nition." Id. at 176.
186. 398 U.S. at 336-37.
and moral attitudes rather than a specific religious belief were the
primary reasons for their newly formed opinions, but the Selec-
tive Service System rejected these contentions.18 7
In both the Welsh and Seeger cases the Supreme Court ac-
cepted a broad base upon which serious conscientious objectors
could file for military exemption. In Welsh, Justice Black stated
that "[bjecause his beliefs function as a religion in his life, such
an individual is as much entitled to a 'religious' conscientious ob-
jector exemption under Section 6 (j) as is someone who derives
his conscientious opposition to war from traditional religious con-
viction." 88 But he did leave a qualification for future reference:
We certainly do not think that Section 6 (j)'s exclusion of those persons
with "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code" should be read to exclude those who hold strong be-
liefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even those whose conscien-
tious objection to participation in all wars is founded to a substantial
extent upon considerations of public policy. The two groups of registrants
that obviously do fall within these exclusions from the exemption are
those whose beliefs are not deeply held and those whose objection to war
does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead
rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency. 189
One year after Welsh, Justice Black wrote the majority opinion
in Gillette v. United States. 190 There the Court rejected the con-
tention that the first amendment protects a draftee whose consci-
entious objection is to a particular war - not all wars. Gillette
said that he could participate in a "just" war; however, he felt that
the Vietnam War was unjust.191 This unique, self-contradicting
contention was refuted because the majority of the justices, in-
cluding Justice Black, decided that the government interest in ex-
ercising the military power outweighed any claim which was
made concerning either the violation of the establishment clause
or the free exercise clause.192
187. Id. at 337.
188. Id. at 340.
189. Id. at 342-43.
190. 401 U.S. 437 (1971). The companion case of Negre v. Larsen was also de-
cided by the Court in the same opinion. "Gillette sought exemption from the
draft, while Negre sought discharge from the Army." Id. at 441 n.3.
191. Id. at 439-41.
192. The majority rejected the petitioners' establishment claim on the ground
that § 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act simply did not discriminate on the
basis of religious affiliation or religious belief. 401 U.S. at 450.
The majority, addressing the free exercise claim, found that governmental inter-
ests existed "of a kind and weight sufficient to justify under the Free Exercise
Clause the impact of the conscription laws on those who object to particular
wars." Id. at 461.
Justice Black only concurred in Part I of the Court's opinion, failing to recognize
the majority's rationale concerning the establishment clause and the free exercise
clause. Id. at 463. (Black, J., concurring).
[Vol. 10: 377, 1983] Analysis of Justice Black
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
C. Taxation of Church Property
Organized religions in the United States own a tremendous
amount of property in addition to buildings designed for worship.
In the 1970 case of Walz v. Tax Commission,193 Justice Douglas
wrote a dissenting opinion in which he presented statistics to
show the real estate value of church property: "It]he religiously
used real estate of the churches today constitutes a vast domain
.... Their assets total over $141 billion and their annual income
at least $22 billion .... And the extent to which they are feeding
from the public trough in a variety of forms is alarming .... ,,194
Church ownership of property led to a wide array of problems
that were eventually presented to the Court while Justice Black
was on the bench. For example, Black rejected the provisions in
the California Constitution providing for a tax exemption on reli-
gious property if an oath was sworn rejecting the overthrow of
government by unlawful methods.99 Justice Black maintained
that "California, in effect, has imposed a tax on belief and expres-
sion." 196 He felt that penalizing individuals and churches by re-
quiring oaths illustrated continued digression of this country from
the first amendment and its protections. 97
The issue of taxes and religion came before the Court in 1970.
In Walz v. Tax Commissioner, Justice Black voted with the major-
ity to sustain a New York City tax exemption for properties
owned by religious organizations which were used for worship ac-
tivities, religious education, or charitable purposes. 98 According
to the appellant, the crux of the matter was that the tax exemp-
tions "indirectly require[d] the appellant to make a contribution
to religious bodies and thereby violate[ d] the provisions prohibit-
193. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 700 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 714.
195. First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S.
545 (1958) (Black, J., concurring) Justice Black's concurring opinion also appears
in part in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958).
196. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958).
197. Id. at 529-31.
198. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The New York Constitution mandates:
Exemption from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemp-
tions may be altered or repealed except those exempting real or personal
property used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable purposes
as defined by law and owned by any corporation or association organized
or conducted exclusively for one or more of such purposes and not operat-
ing for profit.
N.Y. CONST. art XVI, § 1.
ing establishment of religion under the First Amendment
.... ,"199 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, indicated
that Justice Black's opinions in Everson and Engel sufficiently
covered the historical background of the first amendment's estab-
lishment and free exercise clauses. The thrust of Burger's opin-
ion advocated both the neutrality of the state toward religious
bodies and a lack of partiality. In short, the Court restated the po-
sition that government must not interfere with or attempt to con-
trol religious endeavors. Justice Burger emphasized these points
by quoting Justice Black's statement in Everson that the first
amendment "means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can ... pass laws which aid one religion, aid all reli-
gions, or prefer one religion over another."200 The Chief Justice
continued to rely on Justice Black's opinions and finally con-
cluded that tax money for bus transportation of parochial stu-
dents actually may have helped some students attend school,
while without that money they might have been prohibited by
financial burdens. Bus transportation, police protection, and text-
books were a form of "aid" that was held not to violate the estab-
lishment clause.201 Thus, the churches remained autonomous, 20 2
and with Justice Black's supportive vote, church properties con-
tinued to be tax exempt.
D. Inter-Ecclesiastical Actions
In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 203 a New York statute
aimed at transfering hierarchal control from the Russian Ortho-
dox Church (the Patriarch of Moscow and Holy Synod) to the
Russian Church of America came under the Court's scrutiny.
Justice Black struck down the law as a violation of the free exer-
cise of religion. 204 The Court concluded that determination of cler-
199. 397 U.S. at 667.
200. Id. at 670 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)).
201. 397 U.S. at 671.
202. The Court enunciated:
With all the risks inherent in programs that bring about administrative re-
lationships between public education bodies and church-sponsored
schools, we have been able to chart a course that preserved the autonomy
and freedom of religious bodies while avoiding any semblance of estab-
lished religion. This is a "tight-rope" and one we have successfully
traversed.
Id. at 672.
203. 344 U.S. 94 (1952). For a complete discussion of the history and organiza-
tion of the Russian Orthodox Church, see Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian
Orthodox Church in North America v. Kedroff, 302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d 56 (1950).
204. N.Y. Relig. Corp. Law § 107.3 (McKinney 1952) provided in relevant part:
3. The trustees of every Russian Orthodox church shall have the custody
and control of all temporalities and property, real and personal, belonging
to such church and of the revenues therefrom and shall administer the
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ical control was an ecclesiastical matter and not for the
government to decide.20 5
Eight terms after Kedroff, in 1960, the Supreme Court reconsid-
ered the question of whether an appointee of the Patriarch of
Moscow could use and occupy Saint Nicholas Cathedral which
was located in the United States. 20 6 The New York Court of Ap-
peals said that under this situtation the North American Arch-
bishop of the Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church could not
continue his cleric duties in the church.20 7 The Court reversed
the lower court decision because the question was not a matter
for state decision, but was an ecclesiastical matter and should be
settled within the church.208
The Court's refusal to become involved in ecclesiastical "poli-
tics" was again enunciated in the 1970 case of Maryland and Vir-
ginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. The Church of God at
Sharpsburg.209 The Court, with Justice Black's support, refused
to become involved in a property dispute between the regional
General Eldership of the Church of God and the two local congre-
gations that had withdrawn from that organization. The Court
maintained that there was no federal question. One year prior to
that decision, a similar case had come before the Court in Presby-
terian Church v. Hull Presbyterian Church,210 where two local
Presbyterian congregations withdrew from the general hierarchal
organization because of differences in theological doctrines.
When the local congregations had relied on trespass laws to pro-
tect church property from being taken over by the general church
organization, that organization filed a cross-claim for injunctive
relief based upon the premise that civil courts should not enter
into controversies concerning doctrinal questions. 2 11 Justice Black
voted to support the Court's holding that civil courts could not de-
same in accordance with the by-laws of such church, the normal statutes
for parishes of the Russian Church in America ....
344 U.S. at 99; see also N.Y. Relig. Corp. Law §§ 105, 107(1) (McKinney 1952).
205. 344 U.S. at 120-21.
206. Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of
North America, 363 U.S. 190 (1960) (per curiam).
207. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of North
America v. Kreshik, 7 N.Y.2d 191, 209, 164 N.E.2d 687, 696, 196 N.Y.S.2d 655, 667
(1959).
208. 363 U.S. at 191.
209. 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (per curiam).
210. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
211. Id. at 443.
termine property disputes when the question centered upon
whether a church had departed from the original ecclesiastical
doctrines. In short, the Court found that the first amendment was
violated when civil courts entered into ecclesiastical questions
such as the ones advanced by the local Presbyterian churches
and their relationship with the general church hierarchy. 212
E. Oaths Required for Public Employment
Dating from the colonial period, customs in this country have
included reference to God in traditional activities of public insti-
tutions and public mottos. For example, God is mentioned on
coins, currency, over school house doors, at the commencement of
Supreme Court sessions, in administering the oath of the Presi-
dent of the United States, and so on. A controversy was eventu-
ally brought before the Court involving the Maryland
Constitution, which required a declaration of faith in God as a
prerequisite to an appointment to the office of notary public. 213
Roy Torcaso was one appointee who decided not to make such a
declaration and instead, appealed to the courts for his commis-
sion.214 He sought the commission through a writ of mandamus,
but the lower state court dismissed the action.215 Justice Black
wrote the Court's opinion which struck down the Maryland re-
quirement of an oath professing a belief in God. The Court held
that the procedure was a violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments. 2 6
Justice Black referred to colonial history in his Torcaso opinion.
He equated the Maryland oath with the despised "religious test
oaths and declarations [which compelled] a great many of the
early colonists [to leave] Europe."217 The colonists tried to effect
212. Id. at 449. The Court took notice that "not every civil court decision as to
property claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the
First Amendment .... But First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized
when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of
controversies over religious doctrine and practice." Id.
213. Article 37 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution pro-
vides "[n]o religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any office
of profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of
God...." MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 37 (1961).
214. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
215. Id. at 489; see 223 Md. 49, 162 A.2d 438 (1960).
216. 367 U.S. at 495-96. Torcaso also advanced the claim that the state's test
oath requirement violated the provisions of article six of the Federal Constitution
that "no religious Test shali ever be required as a Qualification to any Office of
public Trust under the United States." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. The Court found
it unnecessary to decide the issue of whether or not this provision applied to state
as well as federal offices since the Court was reversing the judgment on other
grounds. 367 U.S. at 489 n.1.
217. 367 U.S. at 490.
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a conformity of the people by requiring religious test oaths that
agreed with the politically dominant group's brand of faith. As a
result, non-believers and non-conformists were placed at a great
disadvantage in the colonies. In particular, John Calvert felt
anguish and consternation when he abstained from oaths that vio-
lated his conscience and his Catholic creed. He established the
colony of Maryland and hoped that this new government would
function without the oaths. The trend against religious test oaths
increased until they were banned in the United States under Arti-
cle VI of the Constitution.218 The first amendment to the Consti-
tution was added as a further protection of religious freedom. As
Justice Black noted, "[the first] amendment broke new constitu-
tional ground in the protection it sought to afford to freedom of
religion, speech, press, petition and assembly."219
In Torcaso, Justice Black pointed to the concepts of free exer-
cise and establishment of religion explained in the cases of
Cantwell and Everson. He refuted the reasoning of the Maryland
Court of Appeals, which had relied on the comments made by
Justice Douglas in Zorach, which indicated that some practices
could be continued based upon the religious nature of people and
traditions in the United States.220
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal govern-
ment can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose require-
ments which aid all religions based on a belief in the existence of God as
against those religions founded on different beliefs .... This Maryland
religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the appellant's
freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against
him.221
F. Interactions Between Justice Black's Views and the Public
Sentiment
It is interesting to compare Justice Black's position in Abington
School District v. Schempp 222 with remarks in a speech he proba-
bly made while he was a Sunday school teacher at the First Bap-
tist church in Birmingham, Alabama. In a two-page essay, with
the words First Baptist Church typed on the upper right-hand
corner of the second page, Black wrote:
218. Id. at 491.
219. Id. at 492.
220. Id. at 494-95.
221. Id. at 495-96.
222. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
Religion is a vital part of the warp and woof of our national existence. Its
glowing, burning truths inspired the hearts of American pioneers. Its sa-
cred precepts established on [sic] home life; shaped our infant institu-
tions and nourished a spirit of equality and democracy. The voice of
Roger Williams and his followers played no small part in impressing the
principles and policies that molded our traditions and crystalized our sen-
timents into written Constitution and Laws. The Bible penetrated the
trackless forests with the pioneers and strengthened the sturdy character
of our early settlers. In the name of Religion and Freedom of Religion
laws were resisted to cross a tempestuous ocean to an unknown land.
Our country has grown great, wealty[sicI and prosperour [sicI beyond the
wildest dreams of averice [sic], under a government instituted by readers
and lovers of the Bible.
Today, there are those who say that no longer do we need religion; no
longer is the Bible essential. Like an ungrateful and overgrown child, we
are urged by some to renounce the old-time religion to which many attri-
bute the stability of our institutions and therefore the cause of our great-
ness. With the pride and boastfulness of the Prodigal Son, we are asked
to leave the safety of our Fathers [sic] House to wander in search of hap-
piness and glory into distant lands and other climes. 2 2 3
Justice Black was apparently speaking to members of his church
about the Bible's place in America. It is not clear whether he con-
tinued to retain these ideals about the priority of religion during
the period when he took part in determining the constitutional
guidelines concerning when and where religion will be allowed in
educational institutions.
Justice Black's stance in the Engel224 and Schempp cases
prompted many people to write the Justice in order to relate their
own viewpoints. Correspondence ranged from admiration for his
stance on the issue, to polite explanation of why they felt that he
was wrong. "Hate mail" was generally ignored by Justice Black,
although on rare occasions he did dictate a letter to an irate corre-
spondent. One woman accused the Court of supporting the 1950's
atheist, Madelyn Murray, simply because she had money and gen-
erated publicity. In his response to this woman, Justice Black ex-
plained that the Supreme Court only adjudicated "cases and
controversies" brought before it. He suggested that she read Arti-
cle III of the Constitution to better understand the duties of the
Court.225
When Justice Black received a long letter from an elderly wo-
man who incorrectly thought he had uniformly voted to uphold
prayer in the classroom, he broke his own self-restraint in dis-
cussing cases with correspondents who either praised or criti-
cized him. The woman praised the Justice, telling him she was
sure God spoke through him. She wrote on the back of the envel-
223. Hugo L. Black, essay, First Baptist Church. Black files, Manuscript Divi-
sion, Library of Congress.
224. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
225. Letter from Hugo L. Black to Mr. Bill Attwood (January 13, 1969). Black
files, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
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ope - "Sealed with a Prayer." Justice Black responded in a kind
manner, explaining the problems presented in Engel and ac-
knowledging that there were two sides to the question. He sug-
gested that she read the opinion, giving her the proper references,
and ended his letter observing, "[t] here are many people who do
not want their prayers written for them by state politicians." 226
Justice Holmes once wrote, "[i]f a thing has been practised
[sic] for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a
strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it . *.".."227
Detractors may say that Justice Black did not measure up to the
standard set by Justice Holmes when he supported the prayer
and Bible reading decisions. These cases made traditional early
morning devotions in public school classrooms obsolete. Yet ad-
mirers will maintain that Justice Black had courage when he re-
lied on the language of the Constitution to guide his votes, rather
than reliance upon tradition and custom.
V. CONCLUSION
During his tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Black was in-
strumental in tearing down a number of the traditional bridges
which had sprung up between the church and state. In Torcaso,
his majority opinion struck down state requirements for public of-
ficials to profess their faith in God.228 Justifying the use of public
money for transportation costs to parochial schools was another
of Justice Black's contributions to a new judicial direction in con-
stitutional law.229 Yet, when the use of public aid became too di-
rect, impacting on faculty and textbooks, he chose to back away
from the ever-growing church-state relationship. The practice of
sectarian instruction on public school property could not be
equated as a general municipal function, and was held to violate
the first amendment. He maintained that attendance in such
classes, although approved by parents, came under the umbrella
226. Letter from Hugo L. Black to Miss Florence A. Lowe (May 10, 1968). Black
ifies, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
227. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).
228. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). Justice Black stated that a Mary-
land constitutional requirement making public office conditional upon a declara-
tion of the belief of existence in God unconstitutionally invades freedom of belief
and religion. Id. at 496.
229. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1. See supra notes 72-80 and accompa-
nying text.
of compulsory school attendance.230 On the other hand, Justice
Black was not oblivious to tradition and legislative purpose. He
remained firm in his own convictions that there were valid rea-
sons for Sunday closing laws, tax exemptions on church property,
restrictions upon teacher-pupil discussions and practices not ap-
proved by school authorities. It was not long, however, before
Justice Black saw his McCollum opinion ignored and his Everson
opinion expanded by the Court, without his approval. In 1969,
Paul Freund observed that in Everson, Justice Black went out on
an edge. Freund stated that, "to]f course, a bridge that carries
you to the verge is apt to be burned behind you when you dis-
cover the verge is further ahead after all." 231 Justice Black at-
tempted to exert influence on the legal evolution of acceptable
standards when religious questions arose. At times he succeeded,
but as the flow of tax money toward parochial endeavors in-
creased, as well as church-state interaction, he found himself in
the minority again.232 Justice Black served the Court with dis-
tinction for thirty-four years.233 Whether his ideals stated in Ever-
son234 regarding the separation of church and state will be
followed by judges in the future remains to be seen.
230. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203. See supra notes 81-87 and ac-
companying text.
231. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L REv. 1680, 1683 (1969).
232. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (Douglas, J., joined by Black,
J., concurring and dissenting); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (Black
J., dissenting); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
233. Justice Black died on.Saturday, September 25, 1971 after serving for 34
years on the Court.
234. The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person
to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to pro-
fess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attend-
ance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be lev-
ied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, par-
ticipate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (emphasis in original).
